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TONI HOUSE, SUPREME SPOKESWOMAN
Irreverent Reporter Turned Mouthpiece Worked Both Sides of the Fence
The Washington Post
Wednesday, September 30, 1998
Annie Groer; Joan Biskupic, Washington Post Staff Writers
"Supreme Court spokeswoman Toni
House."

appeared on camera, House, a chainsmoking gamine, nonetheless was revered
and respected by the reporters,
filmmakers and documentarians who were
her constituency.

So flat and dry a title for such an
exuberant personality. Indeed, in an
institution whose voice might best be
likened to a stentorian rumble, the
essential House sound has always been a
loud, throaty chortle.

She knew court history and ran an
efficient shop. She made sure the
hundreds of journalists who would rush
the court on opinion days could get the
rulings quickly. Good humor often
compensated for the fact that at such a
secretive place, she revealed little
substantive information about the justices.
House herself acknowledged that the
court's internal workings "are cloaked in a
security ... possibly rivaled only by the
National Security Agency or the CIA."

Now the rapturous laugh has been
silenced.
Toni House - the first female to speak

for the highest court in the land, who
insisted on being called "spokeswoman"
lest anyone mistake her for a man - died
yesterday of lung cancer at age 55.
And with her died a bridge between
"old" and "new" Washington. She was an
almost-debutante whose coming out was
canceled by her scandalized godmother
when she quit college her freshman year
to marry and have a baby; a newsie who
after years of reporting in the old
Washington Star's pink ghetto of the
women's section found her true calling cops; a profane, irreverent reporter
fronting for nine of the nation's least
voluble, most circumspect public officials.

She finessed the line between loyalty
to the justices and assistance to reporters,
but was characteristically blunt with
hapless novices: "You don't understand,"
she'd say. "The justices don't answer
questions."
If that kiss-off didn't work, there was
always "What you see is what you get. No
further interpretation, explanation or
illumination is forthcoming from the
denizens of the Marble Temple."

"No one had expected then-Chief
Justice Warren Burger, of all people, to
hire a youngish blond female as his
mouthpiece, especially one who had spent
the last 15 years as a journalist," House
once said.

And, whether one was making a
serious documentary or raunchy feature
like The People vs. Lamy Flynt, she was
always helpful.
House came to the court in 1982, a
year after the death of what she always
called the "late lamented" Star, where she
had worked since 1966. Dazzling her

Though not nearly as recognizable as
White House press secretary Mike
McCurry, in part because she rarely
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nearly two centuries of male control of
Washington's media establishment.

scruffy colleagues with a wardrobe that
was part Carnaby Street, part Junior
League, she spent years covering embassy
parties and White House receptions
before finally escaping to join the few
women already on the news side.

Like a guerrilla Brownie leader with
her after-school rebel troop in Mom's
basement, she helped plan picket lines and
celebrity-packed galas to embarrass the allwhite, all-Male Gridiron Club, and
ultimately force it to integrate. In 1979,
she became president of the Washington
Press Club, formed to counter the
National Press Club's men-only
membership policy. Those battles unified
three generations of female journalists.

By day - prowling the city and
suburbs - she'd hit police stations,

courthouses and lockups, chronicling life's
losers and enforcers. Among the first
women to cover the Metropolitan Police,
she nearly drove rival Al Lewis of The
Washington Post to distraction. He once
asked Police Chief Jerry Wilson how he
could compete with House. "Get a blond
wig and falsies," Wilson replied.

In 1982, House took the high court
job, calling it "a license to learn."
Her early days were bumpy. There was
the time she failed to recognize one of her
bosses, William Rehnquist. Things
gradually improved. Comparing breakneck
morning drives to court from their
Northern Virginia homes, House once
observed that Justice Antonin Scalia,
"who wasn't known on the D.C. Circuit as
El Nino for nothing," could occasionally
be seen "careening across three lanes of
traffic. I count it a point of pride that I
aced the justice out of a lane one morning
as I, too, raced for the [10 a.m. starting]
buzzer."

After days spent with cops, she'd
return at night to her gracious girlhood
home off Foxhall Road where she lived
with her parents. Hugh Osgood House
was a prominent allergist on call to the
District's police and fire departments
(which provided a number of his
daughter's really good sources). Mary
Aiello House was a homemaker famed
among Toni's friends for maintaining a
museum-like attic filled with fine dresses,
matching shoes, handbags and hats
spanning decades. It was clear Toni's
clotheshorse tendencies were genetically
encoded.

Later that day House told Scalia she'd
"seen him on the bridge."

But the light of the House house was
Toni's daughter, Valerie Reuther, now 37,
who works in Seattle as a consultant to
feminist groups.

"Did I cut you off?" he asked sweetly.
"No sir," she said, "I cut you off."
She often worked the way she drove.
"I think of her as an absolutely explosive
person," said office mate Kathy Arberg.
"I got e-mails entitled 'Grrrrrrr.' But then,
she also called everyone 'Sweetie.'"

Thrice wed, House met her first
husband, Eric Reuther, at Wilson High
School and married him at 18. In 1973,
she wed Fairfax County Executive Bob
Wilson, who said she first caught his eye
by wearing leather hot pants to work.
Several years after coming to the court,
she fell in love with William Weller, a
Burger aide whom she wed in 1990.

In an age of obstructionist and
obfuscatory government spokespeople,
House charmed court regulars: "She was
more honest and more candid about what
she could tell you than any other press
officer I have known," said the Baltimore
Sun's Lyle Denniston, dean of the court's

In the early 1970s, while at the Star,
House became an activist intent on ending
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press corps and a onetime Star crony.
"And she had the nicest way of telling you

to get lost."
Copyright © 1998 The Washington Post
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1999-2000 Supreme Court Preview
Conference Schedule
Friday, September 24, 1999
William & Mary School of Law
5:30 - 6:10 p.m.

Registration

Lobby
6:10 p.m.
McGlothlin Court Room
6:15 - 7:40 p.m.

McGlothlin Court Room

Welcome
Davison Douglas, College of William & Mary School of Law

MOOT COURT ARGUMENT
Mitchell v. Helms, No. 98-1648
Advocates:
Erwin Chemerinsky, Univ. of Southern California Law School
Suzanna Sherry, Univ. of Minnesota School of Law
"Supreme Court" Justices:
Joan Biskupic (Chief Justice), The Washington Post
Akhil Amar, Yale Law School
Richard Carelli, Associated Press
Neal Devins, College of William & Mary School of Law
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder Newspapers
Linda Greenhouse, The New York Times
Paul Marcus, College of William & Mary School of Law
Tony Mauro, USA Today
David Savage, The Los Angeles Times

7:40 - 7:50 p.m.

Break

Lobby
8:00 - 9:00 p.m.

Law School Room 120

THE DIRECTION OF THE COURT:
Reflections on the Recent Pastand Implicationsfor the Future
Moderator: Charles Bierbauer, CNN

Panel:
Akhil Amar, Yale Law School
Steve Calabresi, Northwestern Univ. School of Law
Lyle Denniston, The Baltimore Sun

Michael Gerhardt, College of William & Mary School of Law
Susan Herman, Brooklyn Law School
9:00 p.m.
Lobby

Recess/Reception

Saturday, September 25, 1999
William & Mary School of Law
8:15 a.m.
Student Lounge
8:45 - 9:35 a.m.
Law School Room 120

Coffee

BUSINESS AND COMMERCE
Moderator: Joan Biskupic, The Washington Post

Panel:
John Duffy, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder Newspapers
Charles Koch, College of William & Mary School of Law
Tony Mauro, USA Today
9:45 - 10:35 a.m.

Law School Room 120

FEDERALISM
Moderator: Kathryn Urbonya,
College of Williim & Mary School of Law

Panel:
Steve Calabresi, Northwestern Univ. School of Law
Erwin Chemerinsky, Univ. of Southern California Law School
Linda Greenhouse, The New York Times
Suzanna Sherry, Univ. of Minnesota School of Law
10:45 - 12:00 p.m.
Law School Room 120

FIRST AMENDMENT
Moderator: David Savage, The Los Angeles Times

Panel:
Erwin Chemerinskv, Univ. of Southern California Law School
Lyle Denniston, The Baltimore Sun
Susan Herman, Brooklyn Law School
Steve Wermiel, American University College of Law
12:00 - 1:30 p.m.

1:30 - 2:20 p.m.
Law School Room 120

Independent Lunch Break
Speaker's Meeting

CIVIL RIGHTS
Moderator: Charles Bierbauer, CNN

Panel:
Richard Carelli, Associated Press
Neal Devins, College of William & Mary, School of Law
Aaron Epstein, Knight-Ridder Newspapers
Suzanna Sherry, University of Minnesota School of Law

2:30 - 3:20 p.m.

Law School Room 120

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
Moderator: Paul Marcus,
College of William & Mary School of Law

Panel:
Akhil Amar, Yale Law School
Linda Greenhouse, The New York Times
Susan Herman, Brooklyn Law School
David Savage, The Los Angeles Times
3:30 - 4:30 p.m.

Law School Room 120

LOOKING AHEAD
Upcoming Issues in the Court
Moderator: Steve Wermiel, American Univ. College of Law

Panel:
Joan Biskupic, The Washington Post
Richard Careli, Associated Press
Lyle Denniston, The Baltimore Sun
Michael Gerhardt, College of William & Mar School of Law
4:30 p.m.

Adjourn

SEPTEMBER, 1999 CERT GRANTS

98-1811

GEIER v. AM1ERICA.%IONDA

10 TOR CO.

Ruling below (CA 11, 166 F.3d 1236)
Geier maintained that a design defect lawsuit based on the absence of an airbag does not
conflict with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 196, 15 U. S C ) 1381 et seq
(Act), or the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard 208, 49 C F R § 571.208 (Standard 208)
because Honda can be held accountable under state law fo. failing to do more than the minimum
required by the option it chose. Honda argued that a verdict in Geier's favor would stand as an
,..stacle to the federal government's objective of achieving uniform safety in automobile
manufacturing, and consequently, the Ac, :mpliedly preempts Geier's lawsuit. Honda also argued
that a state cannot require a car manufacturer to install airbags in vehicles when Standard 208 makes
them an option. The court below held that Geier's lawsuit is impliedly preempted by the National
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966
Question presented Does federal law preempt a defective design law suit against the
American Honda Motor Company for damages arising trot,. injuries suffered by Alexis Geier when
her 1987 Honda Accord, which did not have an airbag, crashed into a tree"

98-1696

UNITED STA TESV. JOH NOX

Ruling below (CA 6, 154 F.3d 569)
Johnson was convicted of five criminal offenses and sentenced to serve 171 months. His
sentence was later reduced by the 6 h Circuit. In March 1996, the district court vacated two
convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Bailey v. United
States, 5 16 U.S. 137 (1995). The district court refused to credit the extra time Johnson served in
prison (2 V2 years) to his three-year supervised release. The court below held that the date of his
"release" was the date he was entitled to be released rather than the date he walked out the prison
door, and that Johnson should be given credit for the extra time served toward his supervised release.
The court based its rationale on United States v. Blake, 88 F 3d 824 (9 " Cir. 1996). The dissent
would have followed the Ist and 8h Circuits. United States v. Joseph, 109 F.3d 34 (1s Cir. 1997),
United States v. Douglas, 88 F.3d 533 (8t Cir. 1996).
Question presented. When a defendant's sentence of imprisonment is reduced below the time
he has already served, should his term of supervised release commence on the date of his actual
release or on the date he should have been released accordinu to his revised sentence'

98-1960 CORTEZ BYRD CHIPS., INC v. BILL 11ARBERT CO.\STRLCTIOY

CO.

Ruling below (CA 11, 169 F 3d 693)

Bill Harbert Construction Co. (Harbert) entered into an agreement to build a wood chip mill
for Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc., (Byrd), in Mississippi. After a dispute arose between the parties, an
arbitration panel convened in Alabama and rendered an award in favor of Harbert. Byrd filed a
complaint to vacate the award in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Mississippi.
Soon after, Harbert filed an action to confirm the arbitration award in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of Alabama. The court below held that under the Federal Arbitration Act, when
parties fail to specify the venue in their agreement, exclusive jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration
award rests with the district court in and for the district within which the arbitration award was
made.
Question presented: Under Section 9 of the Feder-] Arbitration Act, 9 USC § 9, does the
district court for the district within which the arbitration award was made have exclusive jurisdiction
) confirm arbitration awards when parties fail to specify for such venue in their agreement"

99-51

GUTIERREZ v. ADA

Ruling below (CA 9, 179 F 3d 672)
At Guam's general election of November 3, 1998, gubernatorial candidate Carl T C.
Gutierrez received 24,250 votes (49 83%), and Joseph F Ada received 21,200 votes (43.56%) out
of 48,666 ballots cast. After deducm. the 1,3 13 "undervotes" (ballots cast by persons who had not
made a gubernatorial selection), Gutierrez was declared the winner with a majority of 51.21 % of the
vote. Ada requested a writ of mandamus, arguing that the undervotes should not have been
deducted for purposes of calculating a majority vote. Gutierrez contended that the plain language of
42 U.S.C. § 1422 unambiguously includes only actual "votes cast" for a candidate. Ada points to a
different portion of § 1422, which states "If no candidates receive a majority of the votes cast in any
election ... a runoff election shall be held.
" The court below interpreted the phrase "in any
election" as meaning all votes cast at the general election, and held that ballots that did not make a
gubernatorial selection should have been included in the total number of votes cast for purposes of
calculating a majority.
Question presented. Does 42 U.S.C. § 1422, which sets forth the qualifications for governor
and lieutenant governor of the Territory of Guam, require a majority vote of all ballots cast or a
majority of votes cast on a particular intiative9

98-1701

UNITED STATES i. LOCKE

98-1706 INTERNA TIONAL ASSN OF LVDEPENDENT TANKER v. LOCKE
Ruling below (CA 9, 148 F.3d 1053):
In the aftermath of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, Washington enacted laws to protect its waters
from oil pollution. These laws require tanker operators transporting oil in state waters to comply
with the state's Best Achievable Protection (BAP) Regulations. Various tanker operators argue that
the Oil Protection Act of 1990, the Port and Tanker Safety Act of 1978, the Waterways Safety Act
of 1972, and the Tank Vessel Act of 1936 preempt the state's BAP regulations. The court below
held: (1) federal regulation of oil tankers is not so comprehensive as to preempt impliedly the field of
tanker regulation except for design and construction, (2) operational requirements are not subject to
field preemption, (3) radar and emergency towing package requirements are preempted, and (4)
regulations did not impermissibly burden interstate commerce.
Question presented: Are Washington's Best Achievable Protection (BAP) Regulations, which
impose requirements on oil tankers to prevent oil spills, preempted by comparable federal legislation
under the Supremacy Clause or otherwise forbidden by the United States Constitution?

98-1904 UNITED ST4 TES v. WEATHERHEAD
Ruling below (CA 9, 157 F.3d 735):
In 1994, Weatherhead sent requests under Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) relating to
the extradition of his client Sally Croft, who was on trial for conspiracy to murder the United Stat,,
Attorney for Oregon. Croft was a member of the Rajneeshpuram commune in Central Oregon in the
1980s. In 1995, the State Department advised Weatherhead that the letter contained information
classified as confidential in the interest of foreign relations and would therefore be withheld under
FOIA Exemption 1. The district court held that the government failed to demonstrate the letter was
properly classified, but upon in camera review, the court "knew without hesitation or reservation that
the letter could not be released." The court below agreed that the government never met its burden
of identifying or describing any damage to national security that would result from the release of the
letter; however, after reviewing the letter in camera, the court said that it failed to comprehend how
disclosing the letter at this time could cause harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the
United States and therefore held the letter "innocuous."
Question presented: Was the Freedom of Information Act's Exemption 1, 5 U.S.C. §
552(b)(1), which protects classified information from disclosure, properly used to withhold a letter
from the British Foreign Office to the United States Department of Justice?

98-21

WEEKS v. ANGELONE

Ruling below (CA 4, 176 F.3d 249):

Weeks was convicted of the capital murder of Virginia State Trooper Jose Cavazos and,
upon the jury's finding that his conduct satisfied the "vileness" requirement, was sentenced to death.
After exhausting all available state remedies and unsuccessfully petitioning for habeas corpus, Weeks
filed for a certificate of appealability with the Court of Appeals. Weeks argued that the trial court's
refusal to clarify its capital sentencing instruction to the jury after they indicated confusion with the
instruction prevented the consideration of relevant mitigating evidence in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, that the trial court's refusal to appoint ballistics and pathology experts
violated his due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that the Supreme Court of
Virginia's refusal to suppress his confession to the murder of Trooper Cavazos, which was made
after he initially cut off questioning, violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court
concluded that Weeks failed to make "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right"
and dismissed his petition.
Questions presented: 1) Did the trial court's refusal to clarify its capital sentencing instruction
after the jury indicated confusion prevent consideration of mitigating evidence in violation of the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments? 2) Did the trial court's refusal to appoint ballistics and
pathology experts violate due process? 3) Did the Virginia Supreme Court's refusal to suppress
Weeks' confession that was made after he initially cut off questioning violate his Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights?
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